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Abstract
The exploration/exploitation trade-off (EE trade-off) describes how, when faced with
several competing alternatives, decision-makers must often choose between a known
good alternative (exploitation) and one or more unknown but potentially more
rewarding alternatives (exploration). Prevailing theory on how humans perform the EE
trade-off states that uncertainty is a major motivator for exploration: the more
uncertain the environment, the more exploration that will occur. The current paper
examines whether exploratory behaviour in both choice and attention may be impacted
differently depending on whether uncertainty is onset suddenly (unexpected
uncertainty), or more slowly (expected uncertainty). It is shown that when uncertainty
was expected, participants tended to explore less with their choices, but not their
attention, than when it was unexpected. Crucially, the impact of this "protection from
uncertainty" on exploration only occurred when participants had an opportunity to
learn the structure of the task prior to experiencing uncertainty. This suggests that the
interaction between uncertainty and exploration is more nuanced than simply more
uncertainty leading to more exploration, and that attention and choice behaviour may
index separate aspects of the EE trade-off.
Keywords: Cognition, Decision Making, Reinforcement Learning, Attention,
Exploration/Exploitation Trade-Off
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Imagine that Mary lives in a large city and is driving to work. From previous
experience she has learned that, on average, her trip to work takes approximately 30
minutes. However, the traffic is unpredictable, and in practice her commute can take
anywhere between 15 to 45 minutes. For the last two days it has taken 45 minutes due
to traffic — Mary attributes this to the normal variability and continues with her usual
route. In contrast, Nick lives in a smaller town — his commute also takes 30 minutes on
average but the traffic is highly predictable and the commute is always between 25 to 35
minutes. For the last two days, however, it has taken Nick 45 minutes to get to work
due to traffic. He concludes that something has changed and decides to try a different
route. The choices made by Nick and Mary both seem sensible due to the differences in
the kind of uncertainty they face. In Mary’s situation her uncertainty (about today’s
commute) is entirely due to the usual expected day to day variation in outcomes, and
she continues to exploit her knowledge of the world (by following the route that has
previously worked for her). In Nick’s case, however, the uncertainty is unexpected: a
previously predictable result has suddenly shown new and unexplained variability,
prompting him to explore a different route.
The key point of this example is that Mary and Nick, though experiencing a
similar delay to work, act differently depending on their expectations of the normal
variability in the environment. When faced with uncertainty Mary (who expects a high
level of uncertainty) continues to exploit her current known best route, while Nick (who
does not expect a high level of uncertainty) explores for new routes. This idea was
discussed by Cohen, McClure, and Yu (2007), who argued that the way that
participants perform this exploration/exploitation trade-off (EE trade-off — the
trade-off between choosing known good alternatives and unknown but potentially better
alternatives) may change depending on whether decision-makers experience unexpected
uncertainty, or expected uncertainty. The logic of this is that, when the environment
suddenly appears to change (i.e., the environment becomes uncertain unexpectedly), it
may indicate that it is necessary for a decision-maker to change their behaviour to
adapt to the new environment. However, if the environment is generally stable with
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some predictable variability (i.e., the environment is expected to be uncertain), then
there is less reason to believe that there is new information to be gained by exploring.
The idea of conceptualising uncertainty into unexpected uncertainty and
expected uncertainty has received growing support. Neurological research has shown
that when uncertainty occurs unexpectedly, there is an increase in the speed of learning
accompanied by a change in cortical activation, possibly in an attempt to learn what
has changed in the environment. For example, it has been shown that the
neuromodulator acetylcholine appears to index expected uncertainty, while
norepinephrine, noradrenaline, and dopamine appear to index unexpected uncertainty
(Marshall et al., 2016; Yu & Dayan, 2005), and different cortical regions are responsible
for processing expected and unexpected uncertainty (Payzan-LeNestour, Dunne,
Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2013). In the field of associative learning, Courville, Daw, and
Touretzky (2006) have proposed that when learners experience unexpected change, they
interpret a fundamental switch in the latent cause (the underlying rules) of the task. If
a participant detects that the latent cause has changed, they should prepare themselves
to learn any new rules to quickly adapt to the new environment. Following Courville et
al.’s (2006) paper, the latent cause theory has been successfully applied to both
simulating existing learning phenomena (Courville et al., 2006; Gershman, Blei, & Niv,
2010; Gershman & Niv, 2012) and motivating novel experimental work (Easdale, Le
Pelley, & Beesley, 2019; Gershman, Jones, Norman, Monfils, & Niv, 2013).
If it is the case that unexpected uncertainty facilitates learning more than
expected uncertainty, it is logical to assume that exploration should increase more
under unexpected uncertainty than expected uncertainty. That is, if an agent thinks
that the environment has changed, it should be aiming to explore as many actions as
possible and observe their effects (maximising information gain while readiness to learn
is high). By contrast, if an organism thinks that the environment has remained the
same, it should be trying to exploit a small number of actions rather than expending
effort learning about the environment (assuming the environment is already fairly well
known).
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The current paper explores this interaction between expected and
unexpected uncertainty and the EE trade-off. Given the vast majority of everyday
decisions are made under some level of uncertainty (i.e. where the outcomes expected
from a given action are not well known, Mehlhorn et al., 2015), understanding what
aspects of uncertainty affect decision-making is critical to understanding human
decision-making more broadly. Specifically, the current paper aims to begin the process
of empirically untangling uncertainty’s interaction with the EE trade-off by examining
how behaviour differs following expected uncertainty and unexpected uncertainty.
To test how expected and unexpected uncertainty and the EE trade-off may
interact, we used two behavioural metrics: choice behaviour and attention. Choice
behaviour (how participants allocate their choices between a series of alternatives) is
the traditional method of assessing the EE trade-off, with selections of the best known
alternatives considered to be exploitative, and selection of any other alternative to be
exploratory (Mehlhorn et al., 2015). These choices are generally examined in
multi-armed bandit tasks (Bradt, Johnson, & Karlin, 1956; Gittins, 1979). In the
multi-armed bandit task, participants are presented a series of choices between several
alternatives or arms, and, on each trial, are required to choose between them. The
participants are then rewarded some number of points based on the arm that they
picked on that trial. This simple task has been important in assessing the EE trade-off
in humans. For example, Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, and Dolan (2006) found
participants would preferentially explore arms that had been associated with high-value
rewards in the past, and Speekenbrink and Konstantinidis (2015) found that
participants would make more exploratory choices when rewards were highly variable.
As well as assessing how participants’ allocate their choices, assessing how
participants use their attention (measured through eye-gaze) to solve EE trade-off
problems has recently gained traction in the broader learning literature (Beesley,
Nguyen, Pearson, & Le Pelley, 2015; Easdale et al., 2019; Walker, Le Pelley, & Beesley,
2017). The attentional EE trade-off, similar to the EE trade-off in choice, describes how
decision-makers must often choose between attending to known useful information (that
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will help them make a decision), and unknown but potentially more useful information
(Beesley et al., 2015). To assess the EE trade-off in attention, the current paper employs
a version of the learned predictiveness design (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). In the
learned predictiveness design, participants are shown two cues, and asked to make one of
two responses. In this task, the correct response differs from trial to trial, and depends
on which cues are present. On every trial there are two cues, a predictive cue (cue A or
B), and one non-predictive cue (cue X or Y). The predictive cues inform which response
will be correct on that trial, while the non-predictive cues provide no information about
the correct response on that trial. Crucially, once the participant learns the relationship
between predictive cues and responses, they should be able to choose the correct
response on every trial. The basic learned predictiveness design can be seen in Table 1.
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Table 1
The basic learned predictiveness design from Le Pelley and McLaren (2003). Each trial,
participants are presented one cue pair made up of a predictive cue (either A or B), and
one non-predictive cue (either X or Y), and are required to make one of two responses
(R1 or R2). The predictive cue determines which of these responses is correct, while the
non-predictive cue is non-informative of the correct response.
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Previous research using the learned predictiveness design has showed that
over time, participants begin to preferentially attend to predictive cues over
non-predictive cues (Le Pelley, Beesley, & Griffiths, 2011; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003).
Beesley et al. (2015) have argued that this preference for predictive over non-predictive
cues represents attentional exploitation, with participants pruning out the irrelevant
non-predictive cue from processing (Niv et al., 2015; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005).
Furthermore, they showed that when the validity of the predictive cue is reduced, such
that it only predicts the correct response on two thirds of all trials, participants show
increased attention to both predictive and non-predictive cues. Beesley et al. (2015)
suggested that this may reflect attentional exploration, as participants look for
information to help them reduce the uncertainty in the task.
The current paper combines the learned predictiveness design with the
multi-armed bandit task to produce a two-armed contextual bandit task (Schulz,
Konstantinidis, & Speekenbrink, 2018; Walker, Luque, Le Pelley, & Beesley, 2019). The
contextual bandit task is similar to the traditional bandit task: on each trial there are
several arms that the participant can pick, and when an arm is picked it pays out some
reward value in points. However, the difference is that in a contextual bandit task the
value of arms changes depending on the context for the decision, usually indicated by
some visual cue.
To give a concrete example, in the current set of experiments the
participants are tasked with selling a combination of two chemicals (represented as
pictures of molecules) to one of two aliens that will pay them in alien currency for the
chemicals. Importantly, only one of the chemicals on offer for sale determines the
amount of currency each alien will pay. That is, one chemical is the predictive cue that
determines the context, while the other chemical is the non-predictive cue. The two
aliens are the arms that change in value depending on the context set-up by the
predictive cue, and the participant’s job is to learn which chemical cue predicts which
alien they should sell to in order to earn the greatest rewards. This two-armed
contextual bandit task provides the ideal platform for examining the attentional EE
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trade-off. As only one of the cues is relevant for predicting the value of responses (the
predictive cue), attention can be compared between the predictive and non-predictive
cue to index an attentional EE trade-off. Furthermore, as the cues themselves do not
have any value ascribed to them, and it is unnecessary to look at them in order to select
alternatives in the task, attention to the cues should only index participants’ attempts
to explore them for information (and not index any attention required to physically
click on an arm, Manohar & Husain, 2013).
This type of contextual bandit task has been used previously to examine the
impact of uncertainty on choice behaviour and attention. Walker et al. (2019) showed
that attentional exploration and exploitation appeared to co-occur with exploration and
exploitation in choice behaviour. They postulated that, though exploratory behaviour
co-occurred in both attention and choice behaviour, this represented two distinct
processes. In choice, participants needed to explore to learn the value of rewards, while
in attention they needed to explore to learn how well the cues predicted those rewards.
Walker et al. (2019) found that when participants engaged in exploration under
uncertainty with their choice behaviour, they also appeared to engage in exploration
with their attention. Crucially, Walker et al. (2019) only assessed the impact of
expected uncertainty on exploratory attention. Given that Cohen et al. (2007)
postulated that unexpected uncertainty and expected uncertainty may have differing
impacts on exploratory choice, it is not unreasonable to think that this may also be the
case for attention.
To summarise, the overall aim of the current study was to directly compare
how participants perform the EE trade-off in both choice and attention when
uncertainty was expected versus when it was unexpected. This was accomplished by
employing a contextual two-armed bandit task, which made it possible to assess the EE
trade-off in both choice and attention. Across four experiments, it is shown that there is
a difference in exploration following unexpected and expected uncertainty, but only
when participants have been given the opportunity to learn the best response strategy
prior to experiencing expected uncertainty. However, this difference in exploratory
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behaviour following expected and unexpected uncertainty is not replicated in attention,
with participants’ exploratory attention appearing to be driven by the absolute level of
uncertainty in the environment.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 aimed to provide a comparison of the impact of unexpected
uncertainty and expected uncertainty on the EE trade-off in choice and attention. By
using a two-armed contextual bandit task in the style of the learned predictiveness
design (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003), it was possible to separate choice behaviour
(measured by selection of responses) and attention (measured by overt attention to cues
observed through eye-tracking).
On each trial, participants were shown two chemical cues which determined
the context of that trial. One of the chemical cues (the predictive cue) determined
which one of two alien button responses would on average pay out the most points on
that trial (the high-value response). The other chemical cue (the non-predictive cue)
was task-irrelevant. There were two conditions in the experiment, the sudden change
condition and the always uncertain condition. The condition determined how
participants would experience uncertainty (operationalised as the level of variability in
rewards). This was done by splitting the experiment into two stages. In the sudden
change condition, the rewards associated with participants’ choices were completely
deterministic during stage one, and as a consequence the uncertainty arose suddenly at
the beginning of stage two. By contrast, in the always uncertain condition, the task
began with a high level of uncertainty and stayed at that level for the entire task. This
meant that participants in the sudden change condition would experience unexpected
uncertainty, but participants in the always uncertain condition would experience
expected uncertainty.
We indexed exploratory behaviour in choice as the amount of low-value
responses (the response that on average yielded less reward) made during the task. In
attention, an increased proportion of trial time attending to the predictive cue over the
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non-predictive cue was interpreted to indicate attentional exploitation, while an
increased proportion of trial time attending to cues overall was interpreted to indicate
attentional exploration. Because unexpected uncertainty has been theorised to motivate
exploration more than expected uncertainty (Cohen et al., 2007; Easdale et al., 2019), it
was predicted that in stage two, participants in the sudden change condition would
show more exploratory behaviour in both choice and attention than participants in the
always uncertain condition.
Method
Participants. Sixty-one participants were recruited from UNSW Sydney
in exchange for course credit1. The mean age was 20.5 years (SD = 4.22); 43
participants identified as female and 18 as male. Testing continued until there were 24
participants in each condition that did not have to be excluded, leaving 48 participants
for the final analysis. During testing, eight participants were excluded due to having
fewer than 50% of trials with at least one fixation on a cue. Five participants who did
not complete all the trials in the allocated time of one hour2 were also excluded. The
two highest performing participants in each condition were paid $20 after data
collection had finished.
Materials
The experiment was implemented in MATLAB using the Psychophysics
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). Participants’ gaze was
tracked using a Tobii TX-300 eye-tracker (Tobii Technology, Danderyd, Sweden)
connected to a 23-inch monitor (1920 by 1080 pixels) that sampled gaze location at 300
Hz. Participants were positioned in a chin-rest approximately 55 centimetres from the
screen. As shown in Figure 1, cues were presented as cartoon depictions of four
molecules, displayed on screen as 500 by 375 pixel images (visual angle 13.8◦ by 10.5◦).
1 All experiments in the current paper were approved by UNSW Sydney HREAP-C, file number 2753.
2 The experimental time was set to one hour based on pilot testing, where the average completion time
for the experiment was around 50 minutes
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The left cue was centred 384 pixels (10.6◦) from left edge of the screen, while the right
cue was centred 1536 pixels (40.7◦) from the left edge of the screen. Both cues were
shown 270 pixels (7.5◦) from the top edge of the screen. The two response options were
cartoon depictions of aliens, each of which was 200 pixels wide by 200 pixels tall (visual
angle 5.6◦ by 5.6◦). The upper response option was centred at 648 pixels (18.7◦) from
the top edge of the screen, and the bottom response option was centred 864 pixels
(23.8◦) from the top edge of the screen, with both response options centred horizontally.
The four images used for cue stimuli were randomly allocated for each participant, and
these allocations were yoked across conditions.
Figure 1 . An example trial from Experiment 1. Participants were shown two molecules
(cues), and told that they were selling a chemical mixture of these molecules to one of
two aliens (responses). They could sell to an alien by clicking on it, and each alien
would pay a certain amount of “sparflex” (an imaginary currency) for the mixture. Cue
and response stimuli were taken from Beesley et al. (2015).
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Design. The design of all conditions used in the current paper is shown in
Table 2. Of the four cues in the design, two (cues A and B) were predictive cues, while
the other two (cues X and Y) were non-predictive cues. The predictive cues were
relevant to completing the task, while the non-predictive cues were task irrelevant. In
all conditions, when cue A was present, response 1 (R1) would confer more points on
average, while when cue B was present, response 2 (R2) would confer more points on
average. Experiment 1 includes the first two conditions of Table 2, the sudden change
condition, and the always uncertain condition. In the sudden change condition, the
rewards were certain (i.e., did not vary) in stage one: the high-value response always
resulted in a reward of 15 points and the low-value response always produced a reward
of 10 points. In stage two, however, the reward for choosing the high-value response
varied between 8 and 22 points (chosen randomly from a uniform distribution) and the
reward for the low-value response varied from 3 to 17 points3. This was represented in
the form U(8, 22) and U(3, 17) for high-value and low-value response respectively. In
the always uncertain condition, the rewards varied uniformly from 8-22 or 3-17 in both
stages of the task. Crucially, the relationship between cues and responses never changed
during the task, such that the high-value response always paid out the highest average
reward in the two conditions.
3 These distributions were chosen as on exactly 20% of trials, picking the high-value response would
confer a lower reward than if one had picked the low-value response.
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Table 2
The cues and the associated reward outcomes for each response (R1 and R2) for all four
conditions used in the four experiments. In the sudden change condition (in Experiments
1-4) there was no variability in rewards during stage one, while rewards varied by seven
points either side of the mean value in the always uncertain condition (in Experiments 1
and 2). In the gradual change condition (in Experiments 2 and 3), rewards gradually
became more variable during stage one until they varied six points either side of the
mean score value. Finally, in the mixed change condition (in Experiments 3 and 4),
rewards started without variability, and then shifted abruptly to a “peaked” distribution
early during stage one. In stage two of all experiments, all rewards varied by seven
points either side of the mean in all conditions with a uniform distribution.
Stage one Stage two
Condition Cue pair R1 R2 R1 R2
Sudden change AX 15 10 U(8, 22) U(3, 17)
AY 15 10 U(8, 22) U(3, 17)
BX 10 15 U(3, 17) U(8, 22)
BY 10 15 U(3, 17) U(8, 22)
Always uncertain AX U(8, 22) U(3, 17) U(8, 22) U(3, 17)
AY U(8, 22) U(3, 17) U(8, 22) U(3, 17)
BX U(3, 17) U(8, 22) U(3, 17) U(8, 22)
BY U(3, 17) U(8, 22) U(3, 17) U(8, 22)
Gradual change AX 15→U(9, 21) 10→U(4, 16) U(8, 22) U(3, 17)
AY 15→U(9, 21) 10→U(4, 16) U(8, 22) U(3, 17)
BX 10→U(4, 16) 15→U(9, 21) U(3, 17) U(8, 22)
BY 10→U(4, 16) 15→U(9, 21) U(3, 17) U(8, 22)
Mixed change AX 15→P (9, 21) 10→P (4, 16) U(8, 22) U(3, 17)
AY 15→P (9, 21) 10→P (4, 16) U(8, 22) U(3, 17)
BX 10→P (4, 16) 15→P (9, 21) U(3, 17) U(8, 22)
BY 10→P (4, 16) 15→P (9, 21) U(3, 17) U(8, 22)
Protection from uncertainty 13
Procedure. At the start of the experiment, participants completed a
7-point calibration of the eye-tracker, and were told that they must use the chin-rest
throughout the experiment. Participants were told they would play the role of a
salesperson trying to sell Earthen chemicals to aliens in exchange for a reward of
“sparflex”, a fictitious alien currency, and were asked to choose the chemicals presented
in a way that would maximise their rewards. Before the experiment commenced, they
were also informed that the top two performers in each condition (those who earned the
highest numbers of points overall) would receive a $20 prize4.
Stage one consisted of 256 trials divided evenly into 8 blocks of 32 trials, and
stage two consisted of 256 trials divided evenly into 8 blocks of 32 trials. Every 64 trials,
participants were given an self-paced rest break to reduce fatigue. In both stages, the
cue pairings (AX, AY, BX, BY), positions of each cue (left or right), and positions of each
response option (top or bottom) were counterbalanced, such that every 16 trials each
possible combination of these factors was presented exactly once. The shift between the
two stages was not signalled or announced to participants in any explicit way.
Each trial began with a black fixation cross presented in the middle of the
screen for 1 second, followed by the presentation of the cue stimuli and the response
options (Figure 1). Participants had unlimited time to view the stimuli before
responding. Following the response, a feedback message appeared between the two cues
and remained there for 2 seconds. The feedback message consisted of the points
received on that trial as well as the total points accumulated so far throughout the task.
During this time, both response options remained on screen, and the selected response
was outlined with a thick black border. Following the presentation of feedback, the next
trial began immediately.
Every 32 trials, participants were probed for their knowledge of the
relationship between cues and responses. On each probe trial, participants were shown
each chemical cue (cues A, B, X, and Y) one at a time, and asked to indicate which of the
two alien response buttons would pay the most sparflex for that chemical cue. After
4 Full instructions to participants can be seen in Supplementary A
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they had answered, they were probed for a confidence rating of their response from 1 to
5, with 1 representing ’I am guessing’ and 5 representing ’I am certain’.5
Results
Data were split into blocks of 32 trials for analysis6. Trials that were two
standard deviations above or below the mean trial time in each block were excluded
from analysis. When this criterion was applied, a median of 2 trials and mean of 1.7
trials per block were removed. The key behavioural results are summarised for brevity
in this section, but the full results of all tests can be seen in Supplementary C.
Response behaviour. Throughout the paper, choice data were analysed
using three omnibus logit regressions, one in stage one, one in the transition between
stages one and two (in the case of the current experiment, blocks 8 and 9), and one in
stage two. The regressions were done in R with the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler,
Bolker, & Walker, 2015; R Core Team, 2015), with random intercepts for each
participant. The regressions included fixed effects of condition (with sum to zero
contrasts) and block (with polynomial contrasts), with a random effect of participant,
and were followed up by a Type 3 sums of squares ANOVA using the car package (Fox
& Weisberg, 2011). Follow-up comparisons were using the Benjamini-Hochberg
procedure (as in Konstantinidis, Taylor, & Newell, 2018), to adjust for the different
stages of choice and attention separately.
The response data from Experiment 1 can be seen in Figure 2. In stage one,
participants in both conditions showed learning of the relationship between the
predictive cue and the high-value response, χ2(7) = 662.85, p < .001, making more
exploitative high-value responses over the course of stage one. This increase in
exploitative responding was greater for participants in the sudden change condition,
5 These ratings were exploratory, and did not provide much insight into the cognition of the
participants. In the interest of brevity, we do not present an analysis of the confidence data in this
paper. The data itself can be seen in Supplementary B.
6 Raw data for all experiments can be found at
https://osf.io/kra8p/?view_only=dde91e8ac50b4ed09c8c1fc333a735a0 (Walker, Navarro, Newell, &
Beesley, 2020)
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χ2(3) = 221.77, p < .001, with participants showing overall more exploratory (low-value)
responses in the always uncertain condition, χ2(1) = 104.31, p < .001.
Sudden change Always uncertain


































Figure 2 . The choice data from both conditions of Experiment 1. Stage one occurred
during blocks 1 through 8, and stage two occurred on blocks 9 through 16, with the
dotted vertical line indicating where the stages changed. In the sudden change
condition, rewards became more variable in stage two. In the always uncertain
condition, stages one and two had a high level of variability. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.
In the transition from stage one to stage two, participants in the sudden
change condition showed a decrease in selection of high-value responses that was not
observed in the always uncertain condition, χ2(1) = 72.73, p < .001. Importantly, while
participants in the sudden change condition made more high-value responses in block 8,
b = 3.35, z = 7.97, p < .001, 95% PLCI [2.57, 4.25], this difference between conditions
disappeared in block 9, b = 0.35, z = 1.25, p < .210, 95% PLCI [−0.22, 0.92]. From this,
it is clear that participants who experienced unexpected uncertainty in the sudden
change condition showed a decrease in selecting high-value responses. However, there
was no evidence that participants who experienced unexpected uncertainty were
prompted to explore any more than participants who had experienced expected
uncertainty. In stage two, participants in both conditions showed some improvement in
selecting high-value responses, χ2(7) = 22.89, p = .002, though there was no significant
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difference between conditions, χ2(1) = 3.62, p = .057. Again, this suggested that
unexpected uncertainty did not prompt more exploration compared to expected
uncertainty.
Attention. A dispersion-threshold identification algorithm (Salvucci &
Goldberg, 2000) was used to process the eye-tracking data. A fixation was determined
to have occurred when eye-gaze was contained within a maximum dispersion threshold
of 75 pixels for at least 150 milliseconds. Fixation position was determined by the mean
horizontal and vertical pixel values across the fixation sample. The eye that had the
fewest missing samples on each trial was used for the analysis of that trial. Gaps in the
data of no longer than 75 milliseconds were interpolated between the start of the data
gap and the end of the data gap. Once these data were processed, the proportion of
trial time each participant spent fixating on an area within each cue was calculated.
Only attention to cues was relevant, with other time spent attending to response
options or other space on the screen removed from analysis.
Throughout the paper, eye-gaze data were analysed using three omnibus
linear regressions: one in stage one, one in the transition between stages one and two
(in the case of the current experiment, blocks 8 and 9), and one in stage two. The
regressions were done in R with the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015; R Core Team,
2015), with random intercepts for each participant. The regressions included fixed
effects of condition, cue predictiveness (both with sum to zero contrasts), and block
(with polynomial contrasts), with a random effect of subject, and were followed up by a
Type 3 sums of squares ANOVA using the car package (Fox & Weisberg, 2011).
Follow-up comparisons were done adjusting for multiple comparisons using the
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (as in Konstantinidis et al., 2018), adjusting for the
different stages of choice and attention separately.
The eye-gaze data from Experiment 1 can be seen in Figure 3. In stage one,
participants showed a clear bias towards the predictive cue over the non predictive cue,
χ2(1) = 127.15, p < .001, indicating attentional exploitation. This difference appeared
to be greater in the sudden change condition compared to the always uncertain
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condition, χ2(1) = 40.19, p < .001, with participants who experienced no uncertainty
better able to exploit their knowledge of the relationship between cues and responses.
This difference appeared to be driven entirely by a difference in attending to the
non-predictive cue, with participants in the sudden change condition attending to the
non-predictive cue significantly less than participants in the always uncertain condition,
b = −0.02, t(46) = −3.09, p = .007, 95% PLCI [−.02,−0.01].
Sudden change Always uncertain






































Figure 3 . The eye-gaze data from both conditions of Experiment 1. Stage one occurred
during blocks 1 through 8, and stage two occurred on blocks 9 through 16, with the
dotted vertical line indicating where the stages changed. In the sudden change
condition, rewards became more variable in stage two. In the always uncertain
condition, stages one and two had a high level of variability. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.
In the transition from stage one to stage two, participants in the sudden
change condition showed a significant increase in the proportion of trial time they spent
attending to cues, b = 0.04, t(71) = 3.69, p < .001, 95% PLCI [.02, 0.06], which was not
observed in the always uncertain condition, b = −3.56e− 3, t(71) = −0.68, p = .501,
95% PLCI [−.01, 0.01]. That is, it appeared that participants in the sudden change
condition showed a re-engagement of attention to cues at the onset of stage two.
However there was no difference in the proportion of trial time attending to cues
between the two conditions in block 9, b = 0.01, t(46) = 1.54, p = .131, 95% PLCI
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[−2.73e− 3, 2.28e− 2], with participants showing roughly equal levels of attentional
exploration. It appeared that participants in the sudden change condition increased
their attention to the predictive cue more than the non-predictive cue compared to
participants in the always uncertain condition. However, the three-way interaction was
not significant, χ2(1) = 3.69, p = .055.
In stage two, there was no significant difference between conditions,
χ2(1) = 0.41, p = .524. There was a significant interaction between condition and cue
predictiveness, χ2(1) = 11.25, p < .001, with participants in the sudden change
condition showing a greater difference in the proportion of trial time attending to the
predictive cue and non-predictive cue compared to participants in the always uncertain
condition. That is, surprisingly participants in the sudden change condition showed a
greater level of attentional exploitation than participants in the always uncertain
condition in stage two, despite receiving the same level of environmental uncertainty.
Overall, it appears that participants who experienced unexpected uncertainty showed
less exploratory behaviour than participants who had experienced expected uncertainty.
Discussion
Experiment 1 aimed to examine the difference between unexpected
uncertainty and expected uncertainty on exploratory behaviour in choice and attention.
From previous research, it was expected that when participants experienced unexpected
uncertainty, they would show a greater level of exploratory behaviour than participants
who had experienced expected uncertainty. This was because unexpected uncertainty
would indicate a change in the structure of the environment that required new learning,
driving exploration of the environment.
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the opposite pattern may in fact be
true. When participants experienced unexpected uncertainty, they did not appear to
demonstrate any difference in exploration of their choice compared to participants who
had previously experienced uncertainty. In fact, participants who experienced
unexpected uncertainty showed a greater level of attentional exploitation following the
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onset of uncertainty, with a greater bias towards predictive information in the
environment over non-predictive information in eye-gaze.
One reason this pattern of results may have emerged is the difference
between learning of the relationship between cues and responses in each condition
during stage one. In the sudden change condition, participants were given ample
opportunity to learn the relationship between cues and responses in stage one. By
contrast, this did not appear to occur for participants in the always uncertain condition,
with participants struggling to exploit the high-value response in stage one, and only
showing a small bias in attending to the predictive cue. As the relationship between
cues and responses did not change between stages one and two, it is possible that
participants in the sudden change condition were better able to transfer their knowledge
from stage one to stage two. That is, they were able to maintain a clear bias in
attending to the predictive cue even under uncertainty. It may be the case that to tease
apart unexpected and expected uncertainty, it is necessary to match participants more
closely on their knowledge of the task before experiencing the uncertainty in stage two.
This idea is explored in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to examine the difference in unexpected uncertainty and
expected uncertainty when participants’ knowledge of the relationship between cues and
responses was more closely matched between the two conditions than in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 1, the key comparison was between the sudden change condition, where
participants experienced no uncertainty (in the form of reward variability) followed by a
high level of uncertainty, and the always uncertain condition, where participants always
experienced a high level of uncertainty. In Experiment 2, a third condition was
included: the gradual change condition. In the gradual change condition, participants
began in stage one experiencing no uncertainty, but over the course of stage one
uncertainty increased slowly leading into stage two. The purpose of this was to give
participants a better chance to learn the relationship between cues and responses in
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stage one (as in the sudden change condition), but also not experience a sudden
increase in uncertainty at the onset of stage two (as in the always uncertain condition).
It was predicted that, as participants in the gradual change condition would
not experience unexpected uncertainty at the onset of stage two (but crucially should
also know the relationship between cues and responses), they would show less
exploratory behaviour in stage two than participants in either the sudden change or the
always uncertain conditions. Unlike in Experiment 1, only choice data were collected in
Experiment 2. This allowed a large number of participants to be gathered quickly, and
establish whether it was the case that exploratory behaviour in choice differed in stage
two between the gradual change condition and the other two conditions.
Method
Participants. One hundred and twenty six students from UNSW Sydney
participated for course credit (n = 93), or for $16 cash payment (n = 33). The mean
age was 20.4 years (SD = 3.61); 73 participants identified as female and 53 as male. To
try and ensure that all participants learned something of the contingency between the
cues and the rewards, a decision was made after the initial round of data collection (the
first 105 participants) to exclude participants who performed below chance during the
experiment (fewer than 50% of their choices high-value responses). In total, 19
participants were excluded on the basis of this criterion. Two more participants were
excluded for failing to complete the task during the one hour allocated for the task.
Testing continued until there were 35 participants in each condition, leaving 105
participants for the final analysis. The two highest performing participants in each
condition were paid $20 after data collection had finished.
Materials. All materials were the same as Experiment 1, with the
exception that monitors were not connected to a Tobii eye-tracker, and participants
were not required to put their chin in a chin-rest.
Design. The design of all three conditions is shown in Table 2. The only
difference between Experiment 1 and 2 was that in Experiment 2 the gradual change
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condition was also included. In the gradual change condition, the level of uncertainty in
rewards was increased across the course of stage one. At the beginning of stage one, the
rewards were deterministic and followed the same rule as for the sudden change
condition: the high-value response elicited a reward of 15 and the low-value response
elicited a reward of 10. After this brief period of certainty, the rewards became variable.
At first the rewards varied by one point on either side of the mean (e.g. a reward
distribution of U(14, 16) for a high-value response), with the range of possible rewards
increasing linearly each block until the scores varied by 6 points either side of their mean
(i.e., U(9, 21) and U(4, 16) for high-value and low-value response respectively). Thus, at
the end of stage one (block 8) the rewards in the gradual change condition were almost
as variable as in stage two. The key variable of interest was the proportion of high-value
responses participants made during the task, with more high-value responses indicating
greater exploitation, and fewer high-value responses indicating greater exploration.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that in Experiment 1, with
the following changes: stage one consisted of 256 trials divided evenly into 8 blocks of
32 trials, and stage two consisted of 192 trials divided evenly into 6 blocks of 32 trials.
Every 64 trials, participants were given an self-paced rest break to reduce fatigue.
Unlike Experiment 1, participants were not probed for their knowledge of the
relationships between cues and rewards.
Results
Data were split into blocks of 32 trials for analysis. Trials that were two
standard deviations above or below the mean trial time in each block were excluded
from analysis. When this criterion was applied, a median of 2 trials and mean of 1.7
trials per block were removed. The key behavioural results are summarised for brevity
in this section, but the full results of all tests can be seen in Supplementary D.
The response data for all three conditions are plotted in Figure 4. Visual
inspection of Figure 4 suggests participants learned the contingency in all three
conditions, and this was corroborated in the regression analyses,
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χ2(7) = 1191.47, p < .001. Reflecting the fact that some conditions had less variability
than others during stage one, participants in the sudden change condition adopted the
high-value response fastest, followed by participants in the gradual change condition
and always uncertain conditions respectively, χ2(14) = 429.35, p < .001.
Sudden change Always uncertain Gradual change


































Figure 4 . The choice data from all three conditions of Experiment 2. Stage one
occurred during blocks 1 through 8, and stage two occurred on blocks 9 through 14,
with the dotted vertical line indicating where the stages changed. In the sudden change
condition, rewards became more variable in stage two. In the always uncertain
condition, stages one and two had a high level of variability. In the gradual change
condition, rewards became more variable slowly over the course of stage one leading
into stage two. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
During stage one, participants in the always uncertain condition made fewer
high-value responses than participants in either the sudden change,
b = 2.27, z = 10.14, p < .001, 95% PLCI [1.83, 2.72], or the gradual change conditions,
b = 1.48, z = 7.52, p = .001, 95% PLCI [1.09, 1.87], suggesting that participants engaged
in more exploratory behaviour when uncertainty was higher. An overall difference
between the sudden change condition and gradual change condition was also detected,
with participants in the gradual change condition making fewer high-value responses
than participants in the sudden change condition b = 0.79, z = 3.22, p = .002, 95% PLCI
[0.31, 1.28].
By the end of stage one, the three conditions were showing above chance
selection of the high-value response, but as illustrated in Figure 4 they showed different
levels of high-value responding at the start of stage two. At block 8, participants in the
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sudden change condition made more high-value responses than participants in the
gradual change condition, b = 1.82, z = 3.62, p = .001, 95% PLCI [0.85, 2.88], and the
always uncertain condition, b = 1.26, z = 3.45, p < .001, 95% PLCI [0.56, 2.01], with
participants in the always uncertain condition making fewer high-value responses
compared to those in the gradual change condition, b = 1.26, z = 3.45, p < .001, 95%
PLCI [0.56, 2.01]. However, at block 9 participants in the sudden change condition
made fewer high-value responses than participants in the gradual change condition,
b = 1.12, z = 4.18, p < .001, 95% PLCI [0.60, 1.67], suggesting that the onset of
uncertainty produced an increase in exploratory behaviour. Moreover, this difference
appears to persist beyond the first block of trials in stage two. Participants in the
gradual change condition continued to make more high-value responses than
participants in the sudden change condition across stage two as a whole,
b = 1.05, z = 3.73, p < .001, 95% PLCI [0.40, 1.71]. Participants in the gradual change
condition also maintained a higher level of performance than participants in the always
uncertain condition, b = 1.05, z = 3.22, p = .002, 95% PLCI [0.58, 1.61].7
Discussion
Experiment 2 aimed to explore the effect of unexpected and expected
uncertainty on the EE trade-off when participants had ample opportunity to learn the
relationship between cues and responses before transitioning to an uncertain
environment. In Experiment 1, it was clear that when participants were not given a
chance to learn the relationship between cues and responses prior to experiencing
uncertainty (as in the always uncertain condition), they struggled to consistently
exploit the high-value response. In order to elucidate the relationship between expected
uncertainty and exploration, in Experiment 2 we included the gradual change condition,
where initially participants experienced no uncertainty, before slowly transitioning into
7 For completeness: there were no significant differences in responding between the sudden change and
always uncertain conditions, b = 0.01, z = 0.03, p = .979, 95% PLCI [−0.58, 0.60]. There was some
improvement in stage two for the sudden change condition, χ2(10) = 30.74, p < .001, but nevertheless
by block 14 there was still a significant difference between the sudden change and gradual change
conditions , b = 1.00, z = 2.57, p = .019, 95% PLCI [0.22, 1.82].
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a high level of uncertainty. Crucially, while a sudden shift to uncertainty should have
motivated exploratory behaviour (as a sudden switch to uncertainty may indicate a
broader change in the environment), a slow transition into uncertainty should not.
Indeed, this intuition proved to be the case in the results. While participants
in the sudden change and gradual change both performed close to optimally during stage
one, only those participants in the gradual change condition maintained that strategy of
responding in stage two. This difference in performance was surprisingly persistent:
over the course of stage two, participants in the gradual change condition continued to
outperform participants in the sudden change condition long after one might have
expected any difference to have disappeared. That is, participants who were gradually
exposed to uncertainty appeared to have been protected from the effects of uncertainty
on exploration, and as such we coin this effect the protection from uncertainty effect. In
contrast, participants in the always uncertain condition maintained an exploratory
pattern of low-value responding throughout stages one and two.
The preliminary conclusions from this are twofold. The first is that
unexpected uncertainty seems to induce exploratory behaviour to a greater extent than
expected uncertainty. When participants experience a gradual transition into
uncertainty, they continue to exploit their knowledge of the learnt cue-response
associations, rather than make exploratory response choices.
The second preliminary conclusion is that when participants are given an
opportunity to learn the high-value response in a stable (low uncertainty) environment,
they tend to continue to perform the high-value response in a high uncertainty
environment if there is a gradual transition between the high and low uncertainty
environments. Participants in the always uncertain condition in Experiments 1 and 2
struggled to learn to exploit the relationship between cues and responses in stage one,
and consequently continued to show a high level of exploratory choice in stage two
(performing at around the same level as participants in the sudden change condition).
Crucially, this implies that simply experiencing uncertainty is not enough to protect
participants from exploring, and that the gradual transition into uncertainty is
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necessary to reduce exploratory behaviour.
One other facet of the data was that participants in the gradual change
condition showed an increase in selection of high-value responses up until block 6, after
which there was an inflection point where selection of high-value responses started to
decrease. This is likely due to the fact that at block 7, participants could receive a
reward for selecting the high-value response that was equal to the initial mean reward
value of the low-value response. That is, participants could select a high-value response
(with a mean reward of 15) and receive a score of 10 (the mean reward of the low-value
response). If participants encode scores of 10 or less as low-value rewards, this may have
influenced them to occasionally gamble on low-value responses in an attempt to earn
high rewards (somewhat like probability matching, Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy,
2002).
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 aimed to extend the findings of Experiment 2 in three ways.
First, as Experiment 2 was an exploratory study, it was necessary to run a confirmatory
study to demonstrate the robustness of this protection from uncertainty effect.8
Second, though it was demonstrated that the gradual onset of uncertainty
could protect participants from switching away from the high-value response, it was
unclear whether the gradual onset of uncertainty, or the mere presence of a moderate
level of uncertainty in stage one caused this protection (Gureckis & Love, 2009). That
is, though it was clear that participants in the always uncertain condition in
Experiment 2 made more low-value responses in stage two than participants in the
gradual change condition, they experienced a much higher level of uncertainty overall in
stage one. Therefore, it is unclear whether it is the gradual move from certainty to
uncertainty in stage one that was responsible for reducing exploratory responding in
stage two, or the presence of a moderate level of uncertainty in stage one (compared to
8 The preregistration for this experiment can be found at https://osf.io/5b9yd/. The analysis was
changed from ANOVA to regression, though this did not affect the conclusions drawn from the data.
The results from the pre-registered ANOVA can be seen in the OSF repository, and any inconsistencies
in the analyses noted.
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the high level in the always uncertain condition).
To test this, a new condition, the mixed change condition, was included.
This condition had the same level of score variability as the gradual change condition in
Experiment 2, however this variability was intermixed throughout stage one (rather
than gradually introduced over the course of stage one). The consequence of this was
that the gradual transition from stage one to stage two did not occur, but participants
in this condition experienced the same level of uncertainty in stage one as participants
in the gradual change condition.
Finally, Experiment 3 examined the role of attention in the protection from
uncertainty effect. Specifically, Experiment 3 examined whether the gradual onset of
uncertainty would increase any bias in attention towards the predictive cue in stage
two, indicating an increased level of attentional exploitation. As Experiment 3 was
primarily concerned with examining behaviour related to the protection from
uncertainty effect, the always uncertain condition was omitted in Experiment 3.
For the sudden change and gradual change conditions, it was predicted that
the pattern of responding would replicate that seen in Experiment 3. Mainly, that
participants would make more exploitative high-values responses in stage two in the
gradual change condition compared to the other two conditions. Furthermore, it was
predicted that because the gradual onset of uncertainty was not present in the mixed
change condition, participants in this condition would make fewer high-value responses
than participants in the sudden change and gradual change conditions in stage one, and
subsequently fewer high-value responses than the gradual change condition in stage two
(as these participants would be protected from the uncertainty in stage two). That is,
we expected the mixed condition would not offer the same "protection from uncertainty"
as the gradual condition. Finally, it was predicted that overt attention would align with
response behaviour. As in Experiment 1, exploitative attention was indexed by a bias of
attending towards the predictive cue over the non-predictive cue, while exploratory
attention was indexed by the total level of attention to cues. Thus, it was predicted
that when participants showed more exploratory responding, they would have a more
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exploratory pattern of attention, and the same should occur for exploitative responding.
Method
Participants. One hundred and nineteen students from UNSW Sydney
participated for course credit (n = 78), or for $16 cash payment (n = 41). The mean
age was 22.1 years (SD = 6.04); 70 participants identified as female and 49 as male.
Exclusion criteria were preregistered to exclude participants with an average of under
55% high-value responding during stage one. This cut-off criterion was increased from
Experiment 2, where it was set at 50% (the strictest cut-off to determine below-chance
performance). The increase from a 50% cut-off to a 55% cut-off was done to ensure that
participants who performed numerically slightly above chance, but were still in reality
selecting arms randomly, were excluded from analysis. The decision to restrict exclusion
to stage one was taken as to ensure that participants who increased their exploratory
behaviour dramatically in stage two following uncertainty were not unreasonably
excluded. 10 participants were excluded due to this criterion.
A further five participants were excluded due to having fewer than 50% of
trials with at least one fixation on a cue, and six more were excluded for failing to
complete the task during the one hour time allocated for the task. Testing continued
until there were 32 participants in each condition, leaving 96 participants for the final
analysis. Based on Experiment 2, group size was chosen such that β = .05 to detect a
protection from uncertainty effect between the sudden change and the gradual change
condition9. The two highest performing participants in each condition were paid $20
after data collection had finished.
Materials. In Experiment 3, participants’ gaze was tracked using a Tobii
TX-300 eye-tracker (Tobii Technology, Danderyd, Sweden) in the same fashion as in
Experiment 1.
Design. Experiment 3 included three conditions: the sudden change
condition and the gradual change condition (operationalised as in Experiment 2), and
9 Full details of how β was calculated can be seen in the experiment preregistration at
https://osf.io/5b9yd
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the mixed change condition. The mixed change condition experienced the same amount
of uncertainty as the gradual change condition across stage one, but crucially did not
experience the graduated increase in uncertainty. To do this, the rewards for stage one
of the mixed change condition were first generated in the same fashion as those in the
gradual change condition. After generation, the rewards for all the trials in blocks 3 to 8
were shuffled. Crucially, this meant that in every block in stage one after the
introduction of uncertainty, participants could experience the full variability in the
scores (from 6 points above the mean to 6 points below). It is important to note
however that the resulting distributions of scores in each block were not uniform.
Instead, they emulated the shape of truncated normal distributions, with centres at 15
and 10 points (the mean value of high-value and low-value responses), and tails
truncated at 6 points above and 6 points below the means. Therefore, participants in
this condition experienced many scores close to the mean, and few scores far from the
mean in stage one. This distribution of scores is referred to as P (9, 21) for the
high-value response and P (4, 16) for the low-value response (P standing for “Peaked”).
The design of the new mixed change condition can be seen in Table 2.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the proportion of high-value responses
participants made in the task was measured, with fewer high-value responses indicating
greater exploration. Participants’ gaze was measured in the same fashion as Experiment
1. Exploitative attention was operationalised by the proportion of trial time the
participant spent looking at the predictive cue over the non-predictive cue, while
exploratory attention was operationalised by the total proportion of trial time looking
at both cues.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2, with a few
key exceptions. At the commencement of the experiment, participants completed a
7-point calibration of the eye-tracker, and were told that they must use the chin-rest
while completing the experiment. In both the gradual change and mixed change
conditions, uncertainty was introduced in block 3, with no variability in the rewards
received in blocks 1 and 2 for any condition. To prevent participants from associating
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the onset of uncertainty with the presence of a rest break, in Experiments 3 and 4 rest
breaks occurred every 100 trials, rather than every 64.
Results
Data were split into blocks of 32 trials for analysis. Trials that were two
standard deviations above or below the mean trial time in each block were excluded
from analysis. When this criterion was applied, a median of 2 trials and mean of 1.7
trials per block were removed. The key behavioural results are summarised for brevity
in this section, but the full results of all tests can be seen in Supplementary E.
Response behaviour. Response data from Experiment 3 can be seen in
Figure 5. Given that the first two blocks of the experiment were identical in the three
conditions, only blocks 3 to 8 were analysed in stage one. This was to ensure that the
focus of the analysis would be on the effect of uncertainty on performance in stage one,
without being influenced by the period of certainty in blocks 1 and 210.
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Figure 5 . The choice data from all three conditions of Experiment 3. Stage one
occurred during blocks 1 through 8, and stage two occurred on blocks 9 through 14,
with the dotted vertical line indicating where the stages changed. In the sudden change
condition, rewards became more variable in stage two. In the mixed change condition,
rewards became moderately variable in block three of stage one, then more variable in
stage two. In the gradual change condition, rewards became more variable slowly over
the course of stage one leading into stage two. Error bars represent standard error of
the mean.
The results of Experiment 3 show that the base protection from uncertainty
10 Cursory analysis of blocks 1 and 2 revealed no significant effect of condition, χ2(2) = 1.92, p = .379,
suggesting that the three conditions were fairly well matched on performance during blocks 1 and 2.
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effect for responding in the gradual change condition was partially replicated. In stage
one, participants in the sudden change condition made more high-value responses than
participants in the gradual change condition, b = 0.81, z = 3.14, p = .003, 95% PLCI
[0.32, 1.34]. When transitioning from stage one to stage two, participants in the sudden
change condition went from making significantly more high-value responses than
participants in the gradual change condition in block 8, b = 1.78, z = 4.00, p < .001, 95%
PLCI [0.95, 2.73], to making significantly fewer high-value responses in block 9,
b = 0.90, z = 3.11, p = .003, 95% PLCI [0.35, 1.50].
However, contrary to the findings of Experiment 2, there was no significant
difference between these two conditions overall during stage two, once corrected for
multiple comparisons, b = 0.64, z = 2.03, p = .064, 95% PLCI [0.01, 1.27]. This is
particularly surprising given that there was no suggestion that participants in the
sudden change condition improved after the onset of uncertainty in stage two, nor that
participants in the gradual change condition decreased in their level of high-value
responding over stage two, χ2(10) = 16.10, p = .097.
Surprisingly, participants in the mixed change condition were able to learn to
perform the task well during stage one, contrary to our predictions. Despite not
receiving the gradual move from a certain environment to an uncertain environment,
participants were able to learn to make the high-value response on nearly 100% of trials
by the end of stage one, with no significant difference in performance compared to the
participants in the gradual change condition in stage one, b = 0.26, z = 1.19, p = .279,
95% PLCI [−0.17, 0.69]. By block 8, participants in the mixed change condition were
actually outperforming participants in the gradual change condition,
b = 0.76, z = 2.37, p = .027, 95% PLCI [0.13, 1.42], presumably due to the increased
level of uncertainty in the gradual change condition, though participants in the mixed
change condition still performed worse than participants in the sudden change
condition, b = 0.97, z = 2.15, p = .040, 95% PLCI [0.11, 1.92].
Transitioning into block 9, participants in the mixed change condition made
significantly more high-value responses than participants in the sudden change
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condition, b = 0.94, z = 4.05, p < .001, 95% PLCI [0.49, 1.43]. Crucially, this
performance persisted into stage two, with participants in the mixed change condition
performing significantly better than participants in the sudden change condition in
stage two, b = 0.79, z = 2.94, p = .006, 95% PLCI [0.25, 1.33], demonstrating the
protection from uncertainty effect. There was no evidence for a difference in the rate of
high-value responding between the mixed change condition and the gradual change
condition in stage two, b = 0.16, z = 0.53, p = .597, 95% PLCI [−0.44, 0.75].
Attention. Eye-gaze data for Experiment 3 can be seen in Figure 6. As in
the analysis of responses, only blocks 3 to 8 were analysed in stage one.11
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Figure 6 . The eye-gaze data from all three conditions of Experiment 3. Stage one
occurred during blocks 1 through 8, and stage two occurred on blocks 9 through 14,
with the dotted vertical line indicating where the stages changed. In the sudden change
condition, rewards became more variable in stage two. In the mixed change condition,
rewards became moderately variable in block three of stage one, then more variable in
stage two. In the gradual change condition, rewards became more variable slowly over
the course of stage one leading into stage two. Error bars represent standard error of
the mean.
Stage one showed some evidence for an attentional EE trade-off.
Participants in the sudden change condition had a lower proportion of trial time looking
at the non-predictive cue in stage one compared to participants in the gradual change
condition, b = −0.01, t(62) = −2.60, p = .035, 95% PLCI [−2.39e− 2,−3.35e− 3], and
mixed change condition, −b = 0.02, t(62) = −3.32, p = .009, 95% PLCI [−0.03,−0.01],
though there was no difference observed between the conditions in the proportion of
11 Cursory analysis of blocks 1 and 2 revealed no significant differences between any of the conditions
in the proportion of trial time looking at cues, χ2(2) = 0.94, p = .624.
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trial time looking at the predictive cue, ts ≤ 1.04, ps > .571. This suggests participants
in the sudden change condition were better able to exploit their knowledge of the
contingencies to prioritise their attention to the predictive cue than the other two
conditions.
It was also expected that participants in the uncertain mixed change and
gradual change conditions would spend a greater proportion of trial time looking at cues
in stage one in an attempt to explore them for information. However, though there was
an overall effect of condition on the total proportion of trial time looking at cues in
stage one, χ2(2) = 6.23, p = .044, follow-up tests did not suggest any differences
between the conditions when corrected for multiple comparisons, ts ≤ 2.31, ps > .072.
As such, it is difficult to argue that participants spent longer exploring the cues in the
mixed change and gradual change conditions, rather than simply distributing their
attention to the predictive and non-predictive cues more equally than participants in
the sudden change condition. This may be due to the fact that, unlike in previous
research on the attentional EE trade-off (e.g. Beesley et al., 2015; Easdale et al., 2019;
Walker et al., 2017), participants were generally able to perform the task well in all
conditions (above 85% throughout blocks 3 to 8). As such, participants may have been
less motivated to explore the cues for information to help them further solve the task.
Most surprisingly, there were no significant differences between the
conditions in the transition between stage one and stage two once corrected for multiple
comparisons, nor during stage two. Though there was a significant interaction between
condition and block during the transition into uncertainty χ2(2) = 22.04, p < .001,
follow-up contrasts between all conditions at blocks 8 and 9 did not show any significant
differences, ts ≤ 2.25, ps > .099. Furthermore, despite a difference between conditions in
high-value responding during stage two, a difference between conditions in attention
was not observed during stage two, χ2(2) = 0.37, p = .831.
The lack of a difference between conditions was particularly surprising, given
the effect of condition observed in stage two of the response data. That is, while
participants seem to be exploring more with their responses in the sudden change
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condition than the mixed change condition, this did not appear to be the case in looking
time. To assess the evidence against a difference between the conditions in stage two, a
Bayesian ANOVA using the BayesFactor package in R (Morey & Rouder, 2015) was
run, with fixed factors of condition, block, and cue predictiveness, and a random factor
of participant. Two million iterations of the generating Monte-Carlo algorithm were
run, assuming a flat prior which weighted all possible models equally. The best fitting
model included a factor of block and cue predictiveness, BF10 = 1.65e+ 94.
Compared to the best fitting model, the closest fitting model with an effect
of condition was the model with factors block, cue predictiveness, and condition,
BF10 = 2.88e+ 93. Therefore, the analysis suggests that a model that suggested no
difference between the conditions on attention paid to cues is approximately 5.73 times
more likely than a model assuming a difference.
Discussion
Experiment 3 failed to fully replicate the protection from uncertainty effect
in responding in the gradual change condition, however the effect was observed in the
mixed change condition. The reason for this discrepancy between the two experiments,
and why the effect would still appear in the mixed change condition but not the gradual
change condition is not immediately clear. It is possible the effect is simply stronger in
the mixed change condition, though there was no evidence of a difference between the
mixed change and gradual change conditions in stage two (despite there being a
difference between the mixed change and sudden change condition).
Given that the protection from uncertainty effect was originally observed in
the gradual change condition, and replicated (in a sense) in the mixed change condition,
it seems likely that the failure to detect a protection from uncertainty effect in the
gradual change condition may reflect a Type II error. It is clear though that further
experimentation on the efficacy of the gradual change condition to produce the
protection from uncertainty effect is warranted.
More importantly, these findings suggest that the gradual move to
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uncertainty is not necessary to achieve protection from uncertainty. These results
partially align with the findings of Gureckis and Love (2009). In their task, participants
completed a reinforcement learning task with either a low, moderate, or high level of
reward variability. They found that, when participants experienced a moderate level of
uncertainty, they appeared to be more diligent in solving the task, and thus ended up
with better overall rewards than participants with either high or low uncertainty. The
current task mirrors this finding to a degree. When participants experienced moderate
uncertainty, they made more high-value responses under a following period of high
uncertainty than participants who had experienced no uncertainty.
The more surprising result is that the pattern of participants’ attention did
not match their behaviour. Previous studies have shown that attention and response
behaviour are closely linked (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011). However, the results of
Experiment 3 suggest that they may be separable in specific instances, or that attention
may be indexing the EE trade-off in a different way than originally thought. Experiment
4 attempted to replicate this difference in responding and attentional behaviour.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 aimed to focus on establishing the existence (or lack thereof)
of the protection from uncertainty effect in both responding and attention12. The
gradual change condition from Experiments 2 and 3 was dropped from Experiment 4,
with the focus only on the sudden change and mixed change conditions. This provided
two benefits: first, the sudden change and mixed change conditions would be directly
compared in the omnibus analysis (minimising the need to run follow-up analyses).
Second, it allowed for an increase in the number of participants in each condition, while
also reducing the time needed to gather data.
One issue noticed after running Experiment 3 was the method by which
participants were excluded from analysis, with participants excluded based on their
12 The preregistration for this experiment can be found at https://osf.io/fvuw3/. Again, the analysis
was changed to regression as in Experiment 3, and the results of the original analysis can be seen in the
OSF repository
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overall performance in stage one. However, it is likely that it was easier for participants
to learn the relationship between cues and high-value responses in the sudden change
condition compared to the other two conditions, as rewards in the sudden change
condition did not vary in stage one. Given this, the exclusion criterion may have been
biased to exclude fewer poor performers in the sudden change condition. To address
this, in Experiment 4 the initial period of stage one (where both conditions experience
no uncertainty) was extended to three blocks, and participants were excluded based
only on their performance in these initial three blocks. To keep the length of the
experiment within an hour, the length of stage two was shortened by two blocks, from
six blocks to four.
The eye-gaze exclusion criteria were modified for Experiment 4. In
Experiment 3, participants were excluded based over the whole experiment. However, it
is possible that participants may have had greater or fewer tracking trials in each
section of the task, depending on their level of motivation in each section. To avoid this
issue, participants were excluded if they had fewer than 50% trials with a fixation on
either cue in the three sections of the task: blocks 1 to 3 (where there is no uncertainty
in either condition), blocks 4 to 9 (where only the mixed change condition experiences
uncertainty), and stage two (where both conditions experience uncertainty).13
Based on the results of Experiment 3, it was predicted that participants in
the mixed change condition would make fewer low-value responses than participants in
the sudden change condition when moved to a high level of uncertainty in stage two.
Similarly, it was also predicted that there would not be any difference between
conditions in their proportion of trial time looking at cues in stage two, indicating a
disconnect between responding and attention.
13 While a similar analysis could be done on the data in Experiment 3, this would be in opposition to
our preregistered exclusion criteria. We provide an exploratory analysis of Experiments 2 and 3 using
Experiment 4’s exclusion criteria in Supplementary F.
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Method
Participants. One hundred and twenty one students from UNSW Sydney
participated for course credit. The mean age was 19.7 years (SD = 3.09); 63
participants identified as female and 57 as male14. Exclusion criteria were preregistered
to exclude participants with an average of under 55% high-value responding during
block 1 to 3. Twenty-four participants were excluded due to this criterion. A further
five participants were excluded due to having fewer than 50% of trials with at least one
fixation on a cue in one or more of the three specified sections. Testing continued until
there were 45 participants in each condition, leaving 90 participants for the final
analysis. Based on Experiments 2 and 3, group size was chosen such that β = .2 to
detect a protection from uncertainty effect between the sudden change and the mixed
change condition15. The two highest performing participants were paid $20 after data
collection had finished.
Materials. All materials were the same as those used in Experiments 1
and 3.
Design. The design of Experiment 4 was identical to that of Experiment 3,
with the exception that participants were only assigned to two conditions: the sudden
change and mixed change conditions.
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 4 was identical to that of
Experiment 3, with the exception that stage one now ran for nine blocks of 32 trials
each, with the first three blocks (rather than the first two) of the experiment identical in
both conditions, in that there was no variability in the rewards during this period. This
was to ensure that participants had ample opportunity to learn the relationship between
cues and responses in both conditions in stage one, with the aim to reduce the number
of participants that needed to be excluded from the experiment. At the start of block 4,
uncertainty was introduced for the mixed change condition in the same fashion as in
14 Due to experimenter error, the data from one participant was excluded from the mixed change
condition for failing to meet the eye-tracking criteria was lost, and their data were not included for
calculation of mean age or standard deviation.
15 Full details of how β was calculated can be seen in the experiment preregistration at
https://osf.io/fvuw3
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Experiment 3. To keep the task within an hour, stage two now ran for only four blocks.
Results
Data were split into blocks of 32 trials for analysis. Trials that were two
standard deviations above or below the mean trial time in each block were excluded
from analysis. When this criterion was applied, a median of 2 trials and mean of 1.7
trials per block were removed. The key behavioural results are summarised for brevity
in this section, but the full results of all tests can be seen in Supplementary G.
Response behaviour. The response data from Experiment 4 can be seen
in Figure 7. As in Experiment 3, only blocks 4 to 9 of stage one were analysed,
excluding blocks 1 to 3 where both conditions experienced no reward variability16.
Sudden change Mixed change


































Figure 7 . The choice data from both conditions of Experiment 4. Stage one occurred
during blocks 1 through 9, and stage two occurred on blocks 10 through 13, with the
dotted vertical line indicating where the stages changed. In the sudden change
condition, rewards became more variable in stage two. In the mixed change condition,
rewards became moderately variable in block four of stage one, then more variable in
stage two. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
As expected, both conditions showed a clear improvement in the proportion
16 Cursory analysis of blocks 1 to 3 revealed no significant effect of condition, (χ2(2) = 1.55, p = .214,
suggesting that the three conditions were fairly well matched on performance during blocks 1 to 3.
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of high-value responses made over the course of stage one, χ2(5) = 17.92, p = .003, with
participants in the sudden change condition making more high-value responses overall
compared to participants in the mixed change condition, χ2(1) = 101.02, p < .001. In
the transition between stages one and two, the findings from previous experiments were
replicated, with participants in the sudden change condition making more high-value
responses in block 9 compared to participants in the mixed change condition,
b = 2.62, z = 5.63, p < .001, 95% PLCI [1.77, 3.63], but fewer in block 10,
(b = −1.29, z = −5.21, p < .001, 95% PLCI [−1.80,−0.81].
There was an overall main effect of condition in stage two, with participants
in the mixed change condition making significantly more high-value responses than
participants in the sudden change condition, χ2(1) = 5.73, p = .017. However, unlike in
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 participants in the sudden change condition managed to
improve substantially after the initial onset of uncertainty at the beginning of stage one.
Though participants in the sudden change condition still experienced the marked
decrease in high-value responding in the first block of stage two, χ2(3) = 47.38, p < .001,
they quickly returned to making high-value responses at around the same level as
participants in the mixed change condition by block 13, b = 0.01, z = 0.28, p = .782,
95% PLCI [−0.61, 0.83]. In other words, participants in the sudden change condition
appeared to explore the low-value response immediately after the onset of uncertainty,
but quickly returned to exploiting the high-value response after this initial exploration.
Attention. Eye-gaze data were processed in the same manner as in
Experiment 1. Eye-gaze data for Experiment 4 can be seen in Figure 8. As with the
response data, only blocks 4 to 9 of stage one were analysed17.
17 Cursory analysis of blocks 1 to 3 revealed no significant differences between the conditions in the
proportion of trial time looking at cues, χ2(1) = 2.95, p = .086.
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Figure 8 . The eye-gaze data from both conditions in Experiment 4. Stage one occurred
during blocks 1 through 9, and stage two occurred on blocks 10 through 13, with the
dotted vertical line indicating where the stages changed. In the sudden change
condition, rewards became more variable in stage two. In the mixed change condition,
rewards became moderately variable in block four of stage one, then more variable in
stage two. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
In stage one, participants in the mixed change condition spent a greater
proportion of the trial attending time to cues than participants in the sudden change
condition, χ2(1) = 6.09, p = .014, indicating greater exploration of the cues. Similarly,
participants in the sudden change condition were better able to bias their attention to
the predictive cue over the non-predictive cue compared to participants in the mixed
change condition, χ2(1) = 18.21, p < .001. That is, participants in the mixed change
condition showed a greater proportion of looking time to the non-predictive cue than
participants in the sudden change condition, b = 0.02, t(88) = 3.24, p = .002, 95% PLCI
[6.36e− 3, 2.58e− 2], but there was no significant difference between the conditions in
the proportion of trial time looking at the predictive cue,
b = 6.163e− 3, t(88) = 1.09, p = .278, 95% PLCI [−4.89e− 3, 1.72e− 2]. Overall, these
results indicated greater attentional exploitation in the sudden change condition in
stage one.
The transition between stages showed that participants in the sudden change
condition increased their proportion of trial time looking at the non-predictive cue more
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than participants in the mixed change condition from block 9 to block 10,
χ2(1) = 4.86, p = .028. This suggested that participants in the sudden change condition
re-evaluated the usefulness of the non-predictive cue under uncertainty.
Again, there was no significant difference in attention between conditions in
stage two, χ2(1) = 0.73, p = .394, with participants appearing to spend the same
proportion of the trial looking at cues in both conditions. To assess the evidence against
a difference between conditions in stage two, a Bayesian ANOVA was run, with fixed
factors of condition, block, and cue predictiveness, and a random factor of participant.
The best fitting model included a factor of block and cue predictiveness,
BF10 = 2.39 + e37. Compared to the best fitting model, the closest fitting model with
an effect of condition was the model with factors block, cue predictiveness, and
condition, BF10 = 9.60 + e36. Therefore, the analysis suggests that a model that
suggested no difference between the conditions on attention paid to cues is
approximately 2.49 times more likely than a model assuming a difference.
Discussion
Experiment 4 aimed to confirm the pattern of response behaviour and
attention seen in Experiment 3. Experiment 4 had two conditions, the sudden change
and mixed change condition, and employed stricter and less biased exclusion criteria.
Broadly, this aim was met: participants who had experienced a moderate level of
uncertainty in the mixed change condition made more high-value responses than
participants in the sudden change condition when exposed to a high level of uncertainty
in stage two. Furthermore, there was no evidence to suggest that there was a difference
between conditions in the proportion of trial time looking at cues in stage two, despite
the difference in the level of high-value responses.
Unexpectedly, participants in the sudden change condition returned to
making the high-value response at the same level as participants in the mixed change
condition by the end of stage two, contrary to the results of previous experiments. This
may have occurred due to Experiment 4’s stricter exclusion criterion for responding. As
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the response accuracy criterion ensured that participants had over 55% high-value
responding over blocks 1 to 3, only participants who were able to quickly pick up the
relationship between cues and responses were included for analysis. Therefore, though
participants in the sudden change condition were still affected by the sudden onset of
uncertainty in stage two, these high performing participants may have been able to
quickly learn that the relationships between cues and responses from stage one were
maintained in stage two. However, when we tested this idea in an exploratory analysis
of Experiments 2 and 3 using the exclusion criteria from Experiment 4 (Supplementary
F), there was no suggestion of a rapid return to high-value responding in stage two of
the sudden change condition. Besides sampling variability, it is unclear why participants
in Experiment 4 experienced such a strong return to high-value responding in stage two
compared to these other experiments.
In terms of the attentional data, there was evidence in favour of an
attentional EE trade-off during stage one. That is, participants in the sudden change
condition showed a greater bias in attention between the predictive cue and the
non-predictive cue compared to that shown for participants in the mixed change
condition, while participants in the mixed change condition paid more attention to cues
overall. However, there was no difference between conditions in stage two, with
participants in the two conditions paying roughly equal attention to the cues.
Importantly, the pattern of data observed in Experiment 3 was supported: following the
introduction of uncertainty, participants in the sudden change condition showed the
largest increase in attending to the non-predictive cue. This indicated an increase in
exploratory attention at the onset of uncertainty, and may reflect a re-evaluation of
information previously thought to be uninformative.
General discussion
The current paper explored the impact of expected and unexpected
uncertainty on the exploitation/exploration trade-off (EE trade-off). Four conditions
were employed across four experiments that differed in the way uncertainty was
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introduced to participants, and the impact of this uncertainty on responding and
attention was assessed. In each experiment, participants were shown two cues and asked
to choose between two possible responses. One of those cues predicted which response
would on average give more points, while the other was non-informative. The way that
participants were exposed to uncertainty was manipulated in an initial stage (stage
one), before all participants were exposed to a high level of uncertainty in a following
stage (stage two). Crucially, the relationship between cues and high-value responses was
identical in both stages. Therefore, any sustained attempt to explore once the
participant had learned the relationship between cues and high-value responses had
been learned was counter to the goal of maximising rewards.
It was found that when a high level of uncertainty was introduced
unexpectedly in stage two, exploration increased dramatically. In contrast, when
participants had experienced a continued period of uncertainty in the first stage, their
pattern of responding was more exploitative in stage two. That is, the extent to which
participants showed exploitative response behaviour (favouring the high-value response)
was modulated by the type of uncertainty they had experienced. With a high level of
uncertainty throughout the first stage (i.e., in the always uncertain condition;
Experiments 1 and 2), participants tended to fail to learn the relationship between cues
and high-value responses, responding at a sub-optimal rate throughout the task.
However, when the level of uncertainty was more moderate, such that participants could
learn the association between cues and high-value responses (e.g., in the gradual
uncertainty condition; Experiments 2 and 3) the likelihood of seeing more high-value
responding in stage two increased. We term this a protection from uncertainty effect,
where a moderate level of uncertainty actually benefits high-value responding in
uncertain conditions, compared to when uncertainty is experienced more suddenly. This
finding aligns well with Cohen et al. (2007), who postulated that participants should
increase their exploration following a sudden change in the environment, as it may
indicate that there is new information to learn in the environment. By contrast, when
participants are gradually exposed to a high level of uncertainty, they should be more
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willing to slowly update their understanding of the environment, accounting for
uncertainty while broadly maintaining the same response strategy (Courville et al.,
2006).
Partial reinforcement extinction effect
Our results suggest that the method in which uncertainty is introduced to
participants is key to influencing behaviour. In our case, we have focused on the
exploration/exploitation trade-off in particular, but this this is not to say that
unexpected uncertainty may not impact behaviour in other ways. For example, in the
field of associative learning, the partial reinforcement extinction effect (Sheffield, 1949;
Weinstock, 1954) describes a somewhat paradoxical finding that participants who are
trained on an inconsistent cue/outcome pairing are more resistant to later extinction
(unlearning of that cue/outcome association) than participants who are trained on a
consistent cue/outcome pairing. Similar to the protection from uncertainty effect, the
partial reinforcement extinction effect suggests that unexpected change (i.e., when a
fully reinforced cue/outcome contingency is suddenly degraded) can alter behaviour.
There are clear parallels between the partial reinforcement extinction effect
and the protection from uncertainty effect. In both cases, it appears that when a
change is detected in the task, behaviour is altered to reflect that change. Indeed, the
idea that the partial reinforcement extinction effect may be explained as a consequence
of unexpected change has been explored in the literature (Blanco & Moris, 2017;
Gershman et al., 2013; Haselgrove, Aydin, & Pearce, 2004; Pearce, Redhead, & Aydin,
1997). The trial-based account of the partial reinforcement extinction effect (Harris &
Bouton, 2020) argues that a shift in context between learning and extinction is critical
to facilitate the effect. Once a context shift is detected (e.g., when a fully reinforced
cue/outcome association begins to be extinguished), learners become primed to begin
learning about new associations in the environment, so behaviour changes quickly. If no
context shift is detected (as might be the case for a partially reinforced cue/outcome
association moving to extinction), the rate of learning for new associations remains low,
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so behaviour changes slowly. We have argued here that a similar mechanism may
underlie the protection from uncertainty effect, with participants detecting a kind of
"shift in the experiment context" between stages one and two in the sudden change
condition, which then prompts them to explore for new information in the task.
It should be noted that a key difference between the two effects is that in the
partial reinforcement extinction effect, it is beneficial to try and learn new cue/outcome
pairings following unexpected uncertainty, as the relationship between the cue and the
outcome does actually change. By contrast, in the protection from uncertainty effect, it
is harmful to try and learn new cue/response pairings following unexpected change, as
the value of making the high-value response does not change. This distinction is
important, as the two tasks form complementary bodies of evidence for the impact of
sudden change on behaviour. In the partial reinforcement extinction effect, those who
do not interpret a change in the task are disadvantaged, as the behaviour they should
be performing changes. On the other hand, in the protection from uncertainty effect,
those who do experience the change are disadvantaged, as they are sent on a proverbial
"wild goose chase" for new response strategies despite theoretically already knowing the
strategy to maximise rewards. The combination of these two tasks shows that both
expected and unexpected uncertainty can produce patterns of behaviour that is directly
counter to an agent’s goal of performing appropriately in the task (by either
under-motivating or over-motivating exploration for new cue/response pairings). Taken
together, the partial reinforcement extinction effect and the protection from uncertainty
effect provide strong support for the idea that unexpected uncertainty may promote
exploratory behaviour.
The Attentional E/E trade-off
In terms of the attentional data, there was clear evidence for an attentional
EE trade-off in stage one. Participants in the sudden change condition generally showed
greater prioritisation of predictive information over non-predictive information
compared to participants in conditions with greater uncertainty, demonstrating
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attentional exploitation. In Experiment 4, evidence was also found for attentional
exploration, with participants in the mixed change condition showing greater attention
to cues overall in stage one compared to participants in the sudden change condition.
These findings align with previous work on the attentional EE trade-off (Beesley et al.,
2015; Easdale et al., 2019; Walker et al., 2017).
It was also expected that in stage two, the EE trade-off in the attentional
data would match the EE trade-off in the response data. That is, it was expected that
when participants demonstrated exploratory responding, they would also demonstrate
an exploratory pattern of attention (and similarly for exploitation). To some extent,
this was true: participants in the sudden change condition showed a significant increase
in attending to cues as well as a significant decrease in high-value responding at the
onset of uncertainty. However, between conditions there was no evidence of a difference
in attending to cues in stage two, despite a difference in response behaviour. Indeed,
there was moderate evidence against a difference between conditions in attention.
This finding is at odds with the majority of previous research on the
interaction between attention and choice. A number of papers have argued that
attention is closely tied to choice behaviour, such that one can predict choices via
attention (e.g Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Stewart, Gächter, Noguchi, & Mullett, 2016;
Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews, 2016). Due to this, the current results should be
interpreted with some caution. Though our analysis used Bayesian methods to provide
evidence for the null, the evidence is at best only moderate (even when we combine the
data from multiple experiments, Supplementary H).
Keeping in mind the above caveat, one potential reason that this pattern of
behaviour occurred is that it may be less costly for participants to explore with their
attention than with their responses. While trying the low-value response often risks an
immediate loss of points that directly harms the chance of receiving a monetary reward
at the end, taking the effort to attend to both cues on each trial ensures that any
patterns that emerge in the cue/response associations are not missed. Therefore,
participants in the gradual change and mixed change conditions may have continued to
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explore with their attention in stage two, matching the participants in the sudden
change condition, even though they were able to perform the task reasonably well.
One issue with this explanation is that attention appeared to diverge
between conditions in stage two of Experiment 1, with participants in the sudden
change condition showing greater attentional exploitation than participants in the
always uncertain condition (a finding also seen in Easdale et al., 2019). This result is
difficult to interpret in the face of the other two results (where response behaviour, not
attention, diverged between conditions). Given that no participants were excluded
based on response behaviour in Experiment 1, it is possible that more participants
failed to learn any relationship between cues and high-value responses at all in the
always uncertain condition compared to the sudden change condition. If this were the
case, the bias towards attending to the predictive cue over the non-predictive cue may
have been attenuated in the always uncertain condition in Experiment 1.
Before concluding the discussion on attention, it should be noted the
definition of an attentional EE trade-off used in this paper may be considered at odds
with the traditional definition of the EE trade-off. In the choice domain, if one wishes
to explore, it is generally necessary to forego exploiting (and vice-versa). That is, a
participant that has a single selection to allocate between multiple arms cannot choose
to explore an unknown arm while also exploiting an arm for reward. By contrast, this
strict dichotomy does not exist in our operationalisation of an attentional EE trade-off.
We have defined exploitative attention as attending preferentially to predictive cues,
and exploratory attention as increasing attention to cues overall. Under this definition,
it is possible for participants both to exploit with their attention (preferentially
attending to predictive cues), while also exploring (increasing attention to all cues).
Indeed, this is the pattern seen in the data: when participants explore, they increase
the eye-gaze on cues overall, but not at the expense of a selective bias to predictive over
non-predictive cues (see also Beesley et al., 2015; Easdale et al., 2019). The question is
raised then that if a participant can both explore and exploit simultaneously with their
attention, does an EE trade-off exist at all?
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While ostensibly a fair criticism, it relies on two fundamental premises: that
the EE trade-off exists only at the level of obtained outcomes; and that exploration and
exploitation are entirely separate processes. However, a recent review on the EE
trade-off literature by Mehlhorn et al. (2015) argued that neither of these premises are
true. Mehlhorn et al. (2015) postulated that the EE trade-off exists across three
dimensions: obtained outcomes (either exploiting for rewards or exploring for
information); behaviour of the agent (exploiting by continuously selecting a single arm
or exploring by spreading selections over multiple arms); and the value and uncertainty
related to choice options (exploiting by selecting arms with high subjective values with
low uncertainty or exploring by selecting arms with low subjective values and high
uncertainty). Furthermore, Mehlhorn et al. (2015) postulated that these processes are
not dichotomous, but exist on a continuum. That is, rather than behaviour being
definitively categorised as either exploitative or exploratory, behaviour moves along this
continuum, shifting from more exploratory behaviour to more exploitative, and vice
versa.
The attentional EE trade-off becomes clearer when considered through
Mehlhorn et al.’s (2015) lens. If a participant shows a attentional bias towards
predictive cues, and totally ignores other cues, they show a clear preference for attending
to high value (in this case, informative), low uncertainty cues, and this would indicate
"strong exploitation". By contrast, if a participant shows an attentional bias towards
predictive cues, but also dedicates some attention to other cues with low value or high
uncertainty, the participant shifts towards the exploratory end of the spectrum in a
style of "weak exploitation" or "weak exploration". Under this view of the EE trade-off,
it is clear that an EE trade-off can exist in attention as we have defined it here.
Defining unexpected uncertainty and a continuum of unexpectedness
In the current paper, unexpected uncertainty was operationalised as the
unannounced introduction of noise in rewards at a set point in the task. By contrast,
expected uncertainty was operationalised either as the presence of noise in the rewards
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that gradually increased in magnitude, or as the presence of noise distributed with a
central peak (i.e., the gradual change and mixed change conditions respectively). From
these conditions, it may seem reasonable to define unexpected uncertainty as an
increase in environmental uncertainty that occurs without warning. By contrast,
expected uncertainty is environmental uncertainty that occurs at a level known or
expected by the participant. Following this, it appears sensible to consider these two
states to be mutually exclusive (i.e., uncertainty is either expected or it is not). Indeed,
empirical work by Easdale et al. (2019) has supported this idea of a discrete difference
between expected and unexpected uncertainty. Using a similar two-staged design to the
current study, they showed that participants who experienced unexpected uncertainty
in a predictive cue/response pairing learned more quickly about a new cue/response
relationship with the previously non-predictive cue than participants who experienced
expected uncertainty. This finding suggested that a discrete, noticeable switch from
certainty to uncertainty may be key to motivating exploration.
However, the current results suggest it may be more appropriate to
conceptualise expected and unexpected uncertainty as two extremes of a continuum,
rather than as two dichotomous states. Though participants in both our sudden change
and gradual change conditions experienced some form of unexpected uncertainty, the
extent to which that uncertainty was unexpected may have differed between these two
conditions. That is, in the gradual change condition, each time the range of outcomes
increased in stage one, the participant should have experienced unexpected uncertainty
(as new rewards were presented that had not been seen before). However, it is clear
that these small increases in uncertainty over the course of stage one motivate
exploration far less than the single dramatic increase in uncertainty present in the
sudden change condition. The implication of this is that there may be continuum of
unexpectedness (from expected to unexpected), with greater unexpectedness leading to
greater exploratory behaviour, potentially explaining why participants in the gradual
change condition were protected from the need to explore in stage two.
This conceptualisation of a continuum of unexpectedness aligns well with
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previous research. Yu and Dayan (2005) defined unexpected uncertainty as the
occurrence of an outcome outside the expected range of outcomes. For example, if one
expects rewards in the range of 14-16, and one receives a 10, this unexpected score
creates unexpected uncertainty by virtue of prediction error (i.e., the extent to which
received rewards differ from expected rewards, Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). They also
argued that the extent of the prediction error (i.e., the further away a reward is from
the expected range of rewards) will impact the level of exploration. For example, a
score of 5 when one is expecting 14-16 would have a larger prediction error (and thus
create more unexpected uncertainty) than a score of 12. This idea echoes an earlier
proposal by Pearce and Hall (1980), who argued that prediction error may impact the
rate of learning (with greater prediction error leading to an increased learning rate).
Following from this idea that the level of prediction error may drive exploration, it is
clear that those in the sudden change condition would be more likely to explore in stage
two than those in the gradual change condition as there is a much greater subversion of
expectations about reward values in the sudden change condition. Indeed, this is what
we observed in the protection from uncertainty effect, with those who experienced
small, consistent changes in the reward distribution exploring far less at the start of
stage two than those who experienced one significant change, despite experiencing the
same absolute level of uncertainty. The implication of this finding is that it suggests
that experience of unexpected uncertainty may differ based on the magnitude of
deviance from expected rewards, suggesting that these two states may lie at two ends of
a continuum of unexpectedness.
This idea of a continuum of unexpectedness dovetails nicely with the idea of
the EE trade-off itself lying on a continuum mentioned previously (Mehlhorn et al.,
2015), and opens up some interesting possibilities for future research. For example,
computational models that try to capture the impact of unexpected uncertainty on the
EE trade-off may have to consider whether they will capture unexpected uncertainty in
a discrete fashion (i.e., either an outcome is unexpected or it is not), in a linear fashion
(i.e., on a continuum from unexpected to expected uncertainty), or some combination of
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the two. For example, it may be the case that a clear, detectable change in rewards is
necessary to motivate exploration (as in Easdale et al. 2019, and the sudden change
condition of the current paper), but the level to which the ensuing exploration will
occur is driven by the discrepancy between the reward that the participant predicted
and the new, unexpected reward. Similarly, future experiments may consider trying to
more explicitly manipulate the extent to which uncertainty is unexpected to see how
exploratory behaviour changes. For example, an experimenter might warn the
participant that uncertainty will occur at some point in the task (reducing the level of
unexpectedness) to see how that changes exploration.
Uncertainty, learning, and exploration
Though we have argued for a link between unexpected uncertainty and
exploration in the current set of experiments, we have given less discussion to the
impact of uncertainty on learning. Early work by Pearce and Hall (1980) posited that
uncertainty may be linked to learning rates in associative learning, with higher
prediction errors leading to faster learning. Indeed, Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, and
Rushworth (2007) showed that participants in decision tasks will have a higher rate of
learning under circumstances of greater uncertainty. In their task, they gave
participants two boxes (green and blue), and each trial asked them to select one box,
with the box that was the "correct" choice changing on each trial. In one condition, one
box was the correct choice on 75% of trials for the entire experiment, emulating
expected uncertainty, while in the other condition, the box that was more likely to be
correct changed over the course of the experiment, emulating unexpected uncertainty.
Behrens et al. (2007) found that learning rates tended to be higher in the latter
condition, with participants more readily updating their knowledge of the task under
conditions of unexpected uncertainty. Similarly, Easdale et al. (2019) showed that
participants who experienced unexpected uncertainty learnt new cue/response pairings
quicker than those that experienced expected uncertainty, reinforcing the idea that
learning rates may be higher under unexpected uncertainty compared to expected
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uncertainty.
The idea that learning rates may be higher under unexpected uncertainty
may provide some insight into the protection from uncertainty effect we have found
here. For example, it is possible that in the sudden change, gradual change, and mixed
change conditions, learning rates decreased over the course of stage one (as participants
became familiar with the structure of the task). That is, when there was a sudden
change in uncertainty at the onset of stage two for participants in the sudden change
condition, these participants may have experienced a sudden jump in learning rate that
participants in the other conditions did not. This increased learning rate then worked
against participants in the sudden change condition — though there was nothing new to
learn in the task (besides that uncertainty has increased), participants quickly found
spurious relationships between cues and noisy rewards. In this case, participants might
have switched their responses thinking that they were exploiting a newly identified
response strategy (spuriously identified from a short-term run of high rewards), however
these choices were still considered exploratory responses under our definition of
exploitative and exploratory choices.
While such an explanation may ostensibly seem at odds with our argument
that unexpected uncertainty may drive increased exploration, we posit that the two
ideas are instead complementary. That is, we posit that upon experiencing unexpected
uncertainty, participants show an increase in both their learning rate and their level of
exploration. Such an idea is intuitive — if a learning agent believes the structure of an
environment to have changed, that agent needs to be able to effectively explore the
environment as well as effectively learn what has changed. Once the agent is satisfied
that they understand the environment again, they can return to exploitation and slow
their learning rate18.
18 For further discussion of this idea, see Walker (2020)
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Differences in exclusion criteria
It is worth briefly addressing why the exclusion criteria employed across the
current study have changed across each experiment. The goal of the exclusion criteria
was to avoid analysing participants who did not learn about the relationship between
cues and high-value responses in the task, or (in the case of eye-tracking) had too few
data points recorded to be meaningful. The evolution of exclusion criteria reflect the
natural process of trying to achieve this goal across multiple experiments.For
completeness, we conducted an exploratory analysis where we applied the exclusion
criteria from Experiment 4 to Experiments 2 and 3 (Supplementary F) to check whether
the exclusion criteria impacted our conclusions. We found that, when these exclusion
criteria were applied, the protection from uncertainty effect (a sustained benefit to
high-value responding in stage two for those who did not experience unexpected
uncertainty) persisted in Experiment 2, but disappeared in Experiment 3, possibly due
to the decrease in participant numbers as part of making the exclusion criteria stricter.
Ultimately, we have striven to make these exclusion criteria and the process that lead
up to their inclusion entirely transparent (including preregistering the exclusion criteria
for Experiments 3 and 4), but importantly the reader is also given adequate information
to decide for themselves whether they believe the criteria are appropriate.
Recommendations for future research
The current findings open up a number of avenues for future research. For
example, in the current paper we have operationalised our mixed change condition by
shuffling every trial from the gradual change condition, keeping our level of uncertainty
the same between the gradual change and mixed change conditions, but changing how
uncertainty is introduced to participants. Another method that could be employed is,
instead of shuffling each trial from the gradual change condition, to shuffle every block.
For example, rather than having the slowly progressing increase of uncertainty across
blocks in the gradual change condition (U(14, 16), U(13, 17), U(12, 18), etc), these could
be shuffled, such that there could be a large increase in uncertainty in block one,
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followed by a decrease in block two (e.g., U(10, 20), followed by U(13, 17)). In this way,
the total amount of reward uncertainty experienced in stage one is the same as the
gradual change condition, but the method of the introduction is altered (such that there
may now be several large increases in uncertainty). If participants in this new condition
still show the protection from uncertainty effect in stage two, it would provide strong
evidence that the method by which uncertainty is introduced is not critical to inducing
the protection from uncertainty effect, and is due to a moderate level of uncertainty
being previously experienced in stage one. Such a finding would suggest that it may be
ultimately unnecessary to distinguish between unexepected and expected uncertainty
for the purposes of motivating exploratory behaviour, and would suggest the protection
from uncertainty effect may be driven by prior exposure to a "solvable" level of
uncertainty in stage one.
Furthermore, though we have argued that an attentional EE trade-off may
be better categorised by a continuum of exploration and exploitation in our design, the
EE trade-off may appear more clearly if there was a cost attached to attending to either
cue. For example, in our present experiments participants were given unlimited time to
view both cues on every trial. If a short time-limit was imposed on cue viewing (for
example, one second), participants would be forced to trade-off attending to the
non-predictive cue and predictive cue (as every moment one attends to one of these
cues, they lose an opportunity to attend to the other cue). It is possible that when
participants are forced to trade-off information gathering between the cues, participants
in the sudden change condition may show a clearer bias towards non-predictive cues in
stage two, and a difference in exploratory attention between the mixed change and
sudden change condition would emerge. A time-limit to respond on each trial may also
affect which cue the participant attends to first. An exploratory analysis of initial cue
fixations (collapsing data across experiments) suggested that in both stages in the
sudden change, gradual change and mixed change condition, the predictive cue was
more likely to be fixated before the non-predictive cue (Supplementary I). However, if
participants were given a time-limit to observe the cues, participants attending to
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non-predictive cues before predictive cues may indicate an intention to prioritise
exploring non-predictive cues for new information.
The idea of manipulating decision time may also open other interesting
avenues of research. An exploratory analysis of decision time pooling data across our
experiments (Supplementary J) showed that participants in the sudden change
condition increased their decision time moving from stage one to stage two, whereas the
other conditions showed no change in decision time between the stages. This increase in
decision time appears to be another consequence of experiencing unexpected
uncertainty, and an indicator that participants begin to re-evaluate their environments
when uncertainty occurs unexpectedly. This finding also suggests that participants’
behaviour may differ depending on the length of the trial time. For example, longer
trial times may be associated with a greater level of exploration (when participants
have dedicated time to properly examining both cues), while short trial times may be
associated with exploitation.
Finally, it should be addressed that the protection from uncertainty effect
did not appear in the gradual uncertainty condition in Experiment 3, and indeed
disappeared altogether when the exclusion criteria from Experiment 4 were applied to
Experiment 3. We believe we have made a strong case for the existence of the effect
overall, and indeed an exploratory analysis pooling our experimental data
(Supplementary K) suggests the effect appears clearly in both the gradual change and
mixed change condition. However, we advise that more experimental work to replicate
the effect would be worthwhile.
Conclusions
It has been shown across four experiments how the sudden onset of
uncertainty can motivate exploratory behaviour in response behaviour and attention.
When participants were suddenly exposed to uncertainty, they showed a dramatic
increase in exploring different responses and different cues. Furthermore, it was found
that when uncertainty is expected to be present and the best response strategy had
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been learned, participants appeared to be protected from the effects of uncertainty on
exploration in responding, but not in attention. These findings suggest that how
uncertainty is introduced to decision-makers influences how they perform the EE
trade-off, extending earlier work by Cohen et al. (2007) and Yu and Dayan (2005), and
that attention and response behaviour may index different aspects of the EE trade-off.
This conclusion has implications for how the EE trade-off should be conceptualised,
providing support to the notion that the EE trade-off may represent a continuum of
behaviour, rather than a dichotomy.
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